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Reducing Healthcare Costs 
Requires Good Market Design
PETER CRAMTON AND BRETT E. KATZMAN
A
s the Government comes to grips 
with rising deficits, there is a bigger 
economic tsunami lurking in the 
background—many tens of tril-
lions in unfunded Medicare costs.1 
Innovations are desperately needed to contain 
healthcare costs and avoid fiscal disaster. One 
thing in need of change is Medicare’s pricing of 
equipment and supplies using 25-year-old rate 
schedules adjusted for inflation and periodically 
cut. Everyone agrees that this outdated adminis-
tered pricing system makes little sense.
The solution is to establish prices in com-
petitive markets, and happily, Congress has 
been pushing for certain Medicare supply pric-
es to be set in competitive auctions. The prob-
lem is that even though this pushing began in 
the 1997 Balanced Budget Act, after 13 years 
Medicare’s proposed auctions are a scandal and 
will result in an unsustainable system, loss of 
quality and selective provision of supplies to 
Medicare beneficiaries. The problems are pre-
dictable in theory and the pilot runs thus far 
prove as much.
Pilot auctions began in two cities in 1999 
and 2002. These had serious problems, which 
led the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Ser-
vices (CMS) to make minor changes before ini-
tiating the latest competitive bidding program 
in nine cities in 2008. Congress cancelled the 
2008 auctions due to complaints about unfair 
qualification procedures and unsustainably low 
prices. After further minor changes, the 2008 
auctions were rebid in November 2009. How-
ever, the auctions continue to have fatal flaws.
On September 20, 2010, we presented 
our case by email with supporting materials to 
over two-hundred experts, asking them to be 
signatories to a letter to Health Subcommittee 
Chairman Stark making the points expressed 
here.2 The result was overwhelming: a group 
of 167 experts signed the letter within our 48-
hour deadline. Only 22 declined to sign, and 
in each case, responded that the reason for not 
signing was insufficient time to fully review the 
letter and other materials. Chairman Stark re-
sponded within two days with a letter to the 
head of CMS concluding, “I urge you to give 
these comments and recommendations serious 
consideration. I would also request that you 
inform me in a timely way as to whether CMS 
plans to incorporate any of the recommended 
Peter Cramton is Professor of Economics at the University of 
Maryland and an expert on market design. Brett E. Katzman 
is Professor of Economics at Kennesaw State University; his 
research on Medicare auctions won the Southern Economics 
Association’s best paper award in 2008.
-2-
The Economists’ Voice www.bepress.com/ev October, 2010
changes and if not, why not.” The ball is now 
in CMS’s court.
the problems
So what are the problems with the current design? The overall problems are four. The 
first three combine to assure that the auction 
prices are severely distorted from competitive 
market prices. The fourth, a lack of transpar-
ency, prevents the pricing problems from be-
ing quickly identified and corrected. The result 
is wrong prices. Some are too high, causing 
excess expense. Others are too low, causing 
supply shortages and compromising service 
quality. These problems will directly affect se-
niors and are completely unnecessary.
Bids Are Not Binding Commitments
In the Medicare auction bidders are not bound by their bids. Any auction winner can decline 
to sign a supply contract following the auction. 
This undermines the credibility of bids and en-
courages low-ball bids in which the supplier 
acquires at no cost the option to sign a supply 
contract. This aspect of the proposed system has 
led to the predictable outcome where a number 
of bidders, realizing that prices were set below 
their costs, have refused to sign contracts in the 
pilot programs.
Flawed Median-Bid Pricing Rule
As in standard procurement auctions, bids are sorted from lowest to highest, and 
winners are selected, lowest bid first, until 
the cumulative supply quantity equals the es-
timated demand. The odd part comes next. 
The proposed system sets reimbursement 
prices at the median of the winning bids, 
rather than the clearing price, where supply 
and demand balance. Thus, fifty-percent of 
the winners are offered a contract price less 
than their bids.
Since most providers are small, they lack 
the resources to invest in information and 
strategy in preparing bids. For them an effec-
tive and easy strategy is the low-ball bid. It is 
a winning bid with a negligible effect on the 
price. However, with many firms following 
this strategy the median-bid price is signifi-
cantly biased downward and possibly below 
the cost of all suppliers. This possibility is not 
a problem for the low-ball bidders since, as 
described above, suppliers have the option of 
not signing the contract in such an event. The 
implication is that many prices may be below 
everyone’s costs and therefore be unsustain-
able. Not good. Again, this may lead to supply 
disruptions and shortages, eroding access and 
quality for beneficiaries and discouraging the 
development of improved technologies.
Encourages Strategic Bid Skewing
The current system selects winners using composite bids, which are an average of a 
bidder’s bids across many products, weighted 
by government demand estimates. This pro-
vides a strong incentive for bidders to distort 
bids away from costs—the problem of bid 
skewing. Bidders submit low bids on products 
for which the government has overestimated 
demand and high bids on products where the 
government has underestimated demand. As 
a result, prices for individual products do not 
align with costs. 
Bid skewing is a common problem in U.S. 
timber auctions. There it leads to higher cost 
uncertainty. Its impact in the Medicare auc-
tions and beneficiaries will be much more 
severe—selective fulfillment of customer or-
ders. Medicare beneficiaries are likely to find 
that only high-margin products are available.
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Lack of Transparency
In the Medicare auctions, it is unclear how demand and bidder capacities are deter-
mined, which are the two main inputs other 
than price bids used to determine the winners 
and the product prices. In addition, both qual-
ity standards and performance obligations are 
unclear. Remarkably, bids from the latest test 
of the design, covering nine cities, were taken 
in November 2009 and now more than ten 
months later we still do not know which firms 
were awarded contracts. This lack of transpar-
ency is unacceptable in a government auction, 
leads to fraud and collusion, and is in sharp 
contrast to well-run government auctions 
such as the Federal Communications Com-
mission spectrum auctions.
These four fundamental problems suggest 
that the likely long-run outcome will be a “race 
to the bottom,” in which providers become in-
creasingly unreliable, product and service qual-
ity declines, and fraud and abuse increases.
key features of a good auction design
Competitive bidding techniques have im-proved dramatically over the last decade. 
Complex auctions like the Medicare program 
can be designed to achieve the objectives of 
low cost and high quality with little imple-
mentation risk. The appropriate bidding 
mechanism would arise from a collaboration 
of government officials, industry representa-
tives, and auction experts. It would empha-
size transparency, good price and assignment 
discovery, and strategic simplicity. The result 
would be sustainable long-term competition 
among suppliers that reduces costs while 
maintaining high quality. 
conclusion
The switch to market pricing is not easy for a government agency. Medicare’s experience 
with medical supplies illustrates the challenges 
and offers important lessons. The key lesson 
is that, although market methods hold much 
promise, the government must collaborate with 
both expert market designers and industry to 
maximize the benefits of market methods. The 
government would never consider building a 
bridge without input from bridge experts; like-
wise, it should not attempt to build markets 
without input from experts in market design.
The Medicare competitive bidding pro-
gram demonstrates what can happen without 
expert advice. The Medicare auction creates the 
wrong incentives for bidders. The end result is 
prices that differ dramatically from competitive 
market prices. Continued roll-out of the cur-
rent design will result in government failure, 
both as a result of the decline in service quality 
and selective provision of supplies to Medicare 
beneficiaries. 
Such a failure is not necessary. The govern-
ment should develop a new system based on 
our accumulated stock of knowledge about the 
design of complex auction markets. 
Using competitive bidding to price Medi-
care supplies is a sound idea, but only if it is 
done right.
Letters commenting on this piece or others may 
be submitted at http://www.bepress.com/cgi/
submit.cgi?context=ev.
notes
1. Alan Auerbach and William Gale discuss the size of 
unfunded medicare costs. Available at: http://www.
brookings.edu/papers/2010/0917_federal_budget_
outlook_auerbach_gale.aspx.
2. See Peter Cramton’s “Email to Auction Experts on 
the Medicare Competitive Bidding Program, ” Avail-
able at: http://goo.gl/Q1JR.
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